B20.3345 IS Economics Research Seminar
Professor Arun Sundararajan
Useful textbooks: I'll be handing out copies of all readings that are not on the web. We will draw some material from each of these books, all of which are excellent and worth owning.
Preliminary Schedule (this is not renegotiation-proof)
Akerlof, George, 1970. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500.
Armstrong, Mark, 1996. Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing. Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 1., pp. 51-75
Armstrong, Mark, 2002. Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Arthur, Brian, 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events. Economic Journal, 99, pp. 106-131.
Bakos, Yannis and Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency. Management Science Vol. 45, pp. 1613-1630
Boldrin, Michele and David Levine, 2002. The Theory of Innovation without Intellectual Monopoly.
Cabral, Luis. Salant, David, and Glenn Woroch, 1999, Monopoly Pricing with Network Externalities. International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol. 17., pp. 199-214
Crawford, Vincent and Joel Sobel, 1982. Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6., pp. 1431-1451.
Dutta, Prajit and Roy Radner, 1995, Moral Hazard, in R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1995.
Economides, Nicholas and Steven Salop, 1992, Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market Structure. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1., pp. 105-123.
Farrell, Joseph, and Klemperer, Paul, 2001. Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects. .
Farrell, Joseph, and Katz, Michael, 2000, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets . Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVIII, pp. 413-432.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., 2000, Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry. Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVIII, pp. 373-390.
Gilbert, R. and Vives, X., 1986, Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem. Review of Economic Studies, LIII, pp. 71-83.
Hoppe, Heidrun, 2002, The Timing of New Technology Adoption: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence. The Manchester School, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 56-76.
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C., 1985, Network Externalities, Competition and Contracting. American Economic Review 75, pp. 424-440.
Klemperer, Paul, 1999. A Survey of Auction Theory
Mantena, Ravi and Arun Sundararajan, 2004. Product Scope and Bilateral Entry Deterrence in Converging Technology Industries
Mantena, Ravi and Arun Sundararajan, 2005. Competing in Markets with Digital Convergence
Maskin, Eric, and John Riley, 1984. Monopoly with Incomplete Information. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2., pp. 171-196.
Maskin, Eric, 2001. Roy Radner and Incentive Theory. Review of Economic Design, Vol. 6, Issue 3-4, pp. 311-324.
Matutes, Carmen and Pierre Regibeau, 1988, "Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2., pp. 221-234.
Mendelson, Haim, 1985. Pricing Computer Services: Queuing Effects. Communications of the ACM Vol. 28, pp. 312-321.
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 18, pp. 301-317.
Newman, Mark, 2003, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks. SIAM Review Vol. 45, pp. 167-256.
Radner, Roy, 1981, Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship. Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 1127-1148.
Radner, Roy, 1985, Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting. Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 5., pp. 1173-1198.
Radner, Roy and Peter Linhart, 1999. On the Optimal Schedule for Introducing a New Technology, in G. Chichilnisky, ed., Markets, Information, and Social Choices, Cambridge University Press, pp. 165-190.
Riley, John, 2001. Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling .
Rohlfs, Jeffrey, 1974. A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communication Service. Bell Journal of Economics Vol. 10., pp. 16-37.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, 2001. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, 2002. Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. Rand Journal of Economics,Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 1-22
Salop, S., 1979, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, pp. 141-156.
Shy, Oz. and J. Thisse, 1999. A Strategic Approach to Software Protection. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Vol. 8, pp. 163-190.
Spence, Michael, 1973. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Aug., 1973), pp. 355-374.
Sundararajan, Arun., 2004a. Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing and Protection. Information Systems Research 15, pp. 287-308.
Sundararajan, Arun., 2004b. Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods. Management Science 50, pp. 1660-1673.
Sundararajan, Arun., 2003. Network Effects, Nonlinear Pricing and Entry Deterrence.
Takeyama, Lisa, 1994. The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities. Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. 42, pp. 155-166.
Varian, Hal, 2000. Buying, Selling and Renting Information Goods. Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVIII, pp. 473-488.
Watts, Duncan, 2002, A Simple Model of Global Cascades on Random Networks Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 99, pp. 5766-5771.
on their way